Although the Soviet Union eventually backed down, the incident was one catalyst for the 1947 Truman Doctrine, which sought to contain a growing Soviet threat in the Mediterranean by anchoring both Turkey and Greece as members of NATO by 1952. In an attempt to shield itself from Soviet pressure, Turkey sought help from the United States, which responded by sending U.S. Known as the 1946 Turkish Straits crisis, the Soviet Union increased its Black Sea military presence and pressed the Turkish government to accept its demand for military bases on Turkish soil. This fragile balance threatened to unravel at the end of World War II when tensions flared between the Soviet Union and Turkey, as the Soviet Union pressed Turkey to renegotiate the Montreux Convention so that the Soviets could share control over the Bosporus and Dardanelles with Turkey. The Post–World War II and Post–Cold War Order The United States was not a party to the Montreux Convention. Non–Black Sea powers were restricted in sending their military vessels to the Black Sea (they must be under 15,000 tons per vessel, 45,000 in aggregate, and could only stay in the Black Sea for 21 days). Having acquired a more secure strategic position, Turkey was able to call upon the Lausanne Treaty to manage growing tensions among European powers in the region, which resulted in the 1936 Montreux Convention that established Turkish control over the straits and guaranteed free passage of warships belonging to Black Sea states not at war with Turkey. The first attempt was the 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, and the second and more successful attempt was the 1923 Peace Treaty of Lausanne, which created the basis for the Republic of Turkey. One of Russia’s primary motivations in entering World War I was to seize control of the Turkish Straits, which backfired when the Ottomans and Germans closed the straits, strangling the Russian economy.Īfter the collapse of both the Russian and Ottoman Empires during and at the end of World War I, there was an unsuccessful attempt to redraw the map of the region. Although this never materialized, a stronger but more isolated Russia repeatedly failed to seize control of the strategic Bosporus and Dardanelles (Turkish Straits) from the Ottoman Empire. France and Britain sided with the Ottomans during the conflict, as they feared Russia’s growing strength would result in Russia’s hegemonic position in the region. The bloody 1853–1856 Crimean War between the Ottoman Empire and Russia left hundreds of thousands dead. The decline of the Ottoman Empire continued, as did the regional power struggle in the Black Sea, over which neither side was able to claim a decisive victory. The Crimean city of Sevastopol was established the same year, and from 1783 onward, Russia emerged as a growing Black Sea power as the Ottoman Empire slipped onto a slow, declining path. Nine years after the treaty was signed, popular resentment toward reforms introduced by the Russian co-opted ruling elite, combined with the constant inflow of settlers to the Crimea, fueled regional unrest, giving Catherine II’s envoy, Prince Grigory Potemkin, a long-awaited pretext to annex Crimea through military means with little armed resistance. Russia was also granted the right to protect Christian minorities in the Ottoman Empire, and the nominally independent Crimean Khanate was placed under its influence. Six years of conflict between Russia and an overstretched Ottoman Empire from 1768 to 1774 led to the signing of the 1774 Treaty of Küçük Kaynarca, which provided Russia direct access to the Black Sea region (via the Kerch and Azov ports). ![]() This analysis provides an overview of the region with a view that the past is prologue to the region’s future as restive powers reanimate empirical political and military strategies in a modern context. Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in March 2014 refocused global attention on the strategic significance of a region that rests on the fault lines of two former empires-the Russian and Ottoman Empires-with involvement by European powers, such as Great Britain, France, and Germany. Read the second essay here and the third essay here. ![]() ![]() This Commentary is the first in a series of essays that will examine the strategic significance of the Black Sea region to the United States and NATO.
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